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I. INTRODUCTION
When Alexander Bell demonstrated a phone call to the astonished judges at
the Centennial Exposition in Philadelphia, it launched, as Lord Kelvin put it,
"[T]he most wonderful thing I have seen in America."' From the phone call's
humble beginnings as a tinker project by an eccentric scientist to voice enabled
website applications, phone communications have created a revolution of in-
terconnectivity.2 However, criminal use of modem communications methods3
have forced law enforcement to continuously seek ways to thwart illegal activi-
ties through wiretaps and other means.'
For example, Voice over Intemet Protocol ("VoIP") technology allows
criminals to mislead investigators by changing their caller identification infor-
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I HERBERT N. CASSON, THE HISTORY OF THE TELEPHONE 35-40 (2nd ed. 1910). See also
LEWIS COE, THE TELEPHONE AND ITS SEVERAL INVENTORS: A HISTORY 1 (1995) (calling the
patent for Bell's device, "the most valuable patent ever issued.").
2 See Jim Landers, Believer in Broadband: FCC's Powell Presses for Big Leap for
U.S., DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 29, 2002, at I H.
3 See BRENT E. TURVEY, CRIMINAL PROFILING: AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL EvI-
DENCE ANALYSIS 672 (2008).
4 See Dean Takahashi, Wiretapping Could Stifle VOIP Technology, SAN JOSE MER-
CURY NEWS, Feb. 5, 2007, at IE. Black's Law Dictionary defines wiretapping as "Electronic
or mechanical eavesdropping, usu. done by law-enforcement officers under court order, to
listen to private conversations." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1631 (8th ed. 2004).
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mation,5 and because of VolP's decentralized nature,6 advanced encryption
methods have defeated many wiretaps.' Additionally, unclear laws and regula-
tions frustrate law enforcement in their efforts to listen in on criminals' con-
versations.' Because modem communications provide criminals much greater
flexibility in their ability to conspire, Congress and the states should amend the
wiretap laws to allow law enforcement greater flexibility in wiretapping these
new technologies.9
As modem communication technologies become ubiquitous, the need for
comprehensive wiretap legislation becomes more pronounced. However, the
benefits of wiretapping to law enforcement must always be weighed against
the Fourth Amendment's protection of legitimate privacy interests. At its core,
the Fourth Amendment limits the federal government's ability to intrude into
people's lives." It protects the people from "the general warrants and war-
rantless searches that had so alienated the colonists and had helped speed the
movement for independence."'" However, the Constitution provides little guid-
ance on how the Fourth Amendment is to be applied; as scholars have noted,
"[n]o provision of the U.S. Constitution has been more difficult to interpret or
more controversial in its application .... ."" When dealing with modem com-
munications mediums, which were unthinkable at the writing of the Fourth
Amendment, this difficulty amplifies.
Designing a law to ensure the rapid growth and expansion of technology,
while protecting Americans' essential liberties, is exceptionally challenging.
Only by returning to the fundamentals will this feat be achieved. The current
artificial distinctions between wire, oral, and stored communications in the
5 Jonathan E. Meer, Is the Federal Government Making VoIP Safer?, 25 CoMM. L. 9
(2007).
6 See discussion infra Part II.B.iv.
7 See, e.g., David Wiley, Italy Police Warn ofSkype Threat, BBC NEWS, Feb. 14,2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7890443.stm.
8 Bugging the Cloud: Internet Wiretapping, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 8, 2008, at Tech-
nology Quarterly 28, 30 [hereinafter Bugging the Cloud].
9 See Michael Cooper, Spitzer Wants Wiretap Law to Include New Technologies, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 14, 2004, at B5.
10 Editorial, Dial-Up Law in a Broadband World, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2010, at A26
(explaining how a "surprising coalition of major technology companies and civil liberties
advocates" are pushing for a long overdue upgrade to ECPA).
I See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment was applied to the states with
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1; see also Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (holding that the federal exclusionary rule under the Fourth
Amendment applies to the states).
12 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 761 (1969).
13 OTIS H. STEPHENS & RICHARD A. GLENN, UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES:
RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES UNDER THE LAW 1 (2006).
[Vol. 18
Who Let the Katz Out?
law'4 will continue to produce inconsistent results when applied to modem
communications mediums. 5 The laws must be overhauled to protect legitimate
expectations of privacy while allowing law enforcement to conduct lawful
wiretaps.
At this point, an important distinction must be made. Electronic intercep-
tion-wiretapping-involves a tap between the two points of communication, 6
while electronic eavesdropping involves a listening device on one end of the
communication. 7 For example, a microphone placed in the room of someone
having a conversation--even if that device is sensitive enough to hear conver-
sation being broadcast into that room-is an electronic eavesdropping device. 8
However, if that same device acts as a physical splice in the electrical cur-
rent--even if it only receives one side of the communication-then it is an
electronic interception. There is overlap between the two subjects, but the
focus of this Note will be on electronic interception.
Part 1I will discuss the evolution of wiretapping law through Supreme Court
decisions, legislative enactments, and a brief description of modem communi-
cations technologies. Part III analyzes the definitions and scope of the Elec-
tronic Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA") and the Stored Communica-
tions Act ("SCA").2" Part IV applies the ECPA and SCA to modem communi-
cations technology, illustrating the artificiality of the current statutory scheme.
Finally, Part V calls for legislation reform by returning to the principles of
Katz v. United States and creating three separate categories of communica-
tions-public, quasi-public, and private-that protects the reasonable expecta-
tions of privacy inherent within the design and use of the different communica-
tions technology.
'4 See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1), (2), (17) (2006).
15 CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. McKENNA, WIRETAPPING & EAVESDROPPING: SUR-
VEILLANCE IN THE INTERNET AGE § 1: 12, at 1-21-1-23 (3rd ed. 2008).
16 See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4)-(5) (2006). See also JAMES G. CARR & PATRICIA L. BELLIA,
THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE § 1:2, at 1-3 (2009) ("'Wiretapping,' as the name
itself suggests, refers to the interception of wire (i.e., telephone) communications.").
17 CARR & BELLIA, supra note 16, at § 1.2, at 1-3.
18 See H. Lee Van Boven, Electronic Surveillance in California: A Study in State Legis-
lative Control, 57 CAL. L. REV. 1182, 1183 n.6 (1969).
19 See CARR& BELLIA, supra note 16, at § 1.2, at 1-3.
20 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2006)). The SCA was en-
acted as part of, and contained within, the ECPA. Alexander Scolnik, Protections for Elec-
tronic Communications: The Stored Communications Act and the Fourth Amendment, 78




A. The History of Wiretapping and Electronic Privacy
The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.2'
In 1925, the Supreme Court held the Fourth Amendment must "be construed
in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it
was adopted, and in a manner which will conserve public interests as well as
the interests and rights of individual citizens. 22 The grammatical structure of
the first clause of the Amendment does not absolutely shield an individual's
person, house, or papers from the government's investigatory purposes. 3 In-
stead, the Supreme Court has held that it gives rise to a reasonable expectation
of privacy.24 As Justice Harlan explained, a reasonable expectation of privacy
is a twofold test: "[F]irst that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy, and, second that the expectation be one that society is
prepared to recognize as 'reasonable. ' '25 This shifting boundary of reasonabil-
ity requires regular reexamination by the courts of the boundaries of privacy
that society is prepared to accept as reasonable.26
The second clause of the Fourth Amendment limits the granting of warrants
to when a law enforcement agency provides a sworn statement that demon-
strates probable cause and sufficient specificity 27 to a neutral magistrate.2 8 The
determination of probable cause is a low bar, but it must rise above a police
officer's mere hunch or whim.29 By requiring specificity of the items and plac-
21 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
22 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925).
23 THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION §
1.2.1.2 (2008).
24 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); see also
Peter Winn, Katz and the Origins of the "Reasonable Expectation of Privacy" Test, 40
McGEORGE L. REV. 1 (2009).
25 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
26 See, e.g., Steven Penney, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Novel Search
Technologies: An Economic Approach, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 477,481-491 (2007).
27 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
28 See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 212 (1981) ("The purpose of a warrant is
to allow a neutral judicial officer to assess whether the police have probable cause to make
an arrest or conduct a search.").
29 See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949) (stating that the standards
of probable cause "seek to safeguard citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with
privacy and from unfounded charges of crime.").
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es to be searched and seized," this requirement helps ensure that the warrant
can only be used to obtain evidence relating to a particular crime or crimes.3'
However, the Amendment itself does not provide a remedy for overreaching
government intrusions or defective warrants. Instead, the judicially-created
exclusionary rule provides a remedy32 that restricts the government's ability to
introduce evidence seized through an unlawful search or defective warrant
against the individual.33 The primary purpose of this rule is "to deter law en-
forcement officials from conducting unlawful searches and seizures by depriv-
ing them of the incentive to do so.""
Applying the Fourth Amendment principles to the wiretapping of evolving
communications technologies can be difficult.35 The Supreme Court examined
this issue for one of the first times in the 1927 case Olmstead v. United States.36
Taking place fifty years after the invention of the telephone, Olmstead in-
volved a criminal conspiracy to import liquor, during the era of prohibition, to
the United States through Vancouver, British Columbia.3" Bureau of Prohibi-
tion agents installed wiretaps in the phone lines leading the conspirators'
homes and monitored their communications for months. 8 The wiretaps re-
vealed that twelve primary investors and at least fifty other individuals had
conspired to import contraband liquor with gross sales, in 1920s figures, in
excess of two million dollars.39
A five-to-four majority of the Court refused to stretch "[t]he language of the
[Fourth] amendment . . . to include telephone wires, reaching to the whole
world from the defendant's house or office."4 Further, the Court recognized
that "search and seizure" does not forbid "hearing or sight."' Finally, the Court
explained that Congress was the appropriate branch to adopt a policy to ex-
30 Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927) ("[T]he requirement that warrants
shall particularly describe the things to be seized makes general searches under them impos-
sible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another").
31 See, e.g., Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485-86 (1965) (providing that a warrant's
vague and overbroad description of "literary material" relating to the Communist Party of
Texas was "constitutionally intolerable").
32 CLANCY, supra note 23, at § 13.1 (609-10).
33 E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (holding that the exclusionary rule
applies to the states as well as the federal government); Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471, 484-85 (1963).
34 FISHMAN&MCKENNA, supranote 15, at§ 1:2, 1-6.
35 See Bugging The Cloud, supra note 8, at 28.
36 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
37 Id. at 456, 465.
38 Id. at 456-57.
39 Id. at 456.




clude evidence obtained through wiretaps.4"
Congress adopted this exclusionary policy when it enacted The Communica-
tions Act of 1934 ("Communications Act").43 This Act created the Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC" or "Commission") to, among other
things, regulate common carriers,' such as telephone companies, and also pro-
hibited the unauthorized interception or divulgence of the content of any com-
munication transmitted by wire without the sender's consent.45 Three years
later, the Supreme Court held in Nardone v. United States that the language
prohibited the use of intercepted communications by law enforcement agents
in federal court.46
However, Nardone did not dissuade determined police officers from using
wiretaps to investigate cases, nor did it discourage creative prosecutors from
seeking ways to admit the evidence.47 Two years after Nardone, the Court pro-
vided additional guidance and limits for wiretapping in Weiss v. United
States.48 In Weiss, eight men conspired using the postal system in an attempt to
collect false disability and accident claims from insurance companies.49 A few
months before the indictment, law enforcement officers intercepted, recorded,
and produced stenographic transcripts of every phone call to and from Weiss'
42 Id. at 465-66. A decade before Olmstead, Congress passed a temporary World War I
statute that prohibited and criminalized the tapping of telephone or telegraph lines taken
over by the government. See Act of Oct. 29, 1918, § 1, 40 Stat. 1017, 1017-18. After the
war, Congress allowed this statute to expire, and thus, no federal anti-wiretapping laws ex-
isted when Olmstead's phones were tapped. See Anuj C. Desai, Wiretapping Before the
Wires: The Post Office and the Birth of Communications Privacy, 60 STAN. L. REv. 553,
583 (2007).
43 Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 605, 48 Stat. 1103-04 (1934).
44 Id. at 1070.
"[C]ommon carrier" or "carrier" means any person engaged as a common carrier for
hire, in interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio or interstate or foreign ra-
dio transmission of energy, except where reference is made to common carriers not
subject to this chapter; but a person engaged in radio broadcasting shall not, insofar as
such person is so engaged, be deemed a common carrier.
47 U.S.C. § 153(10) (2006).
45 Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 605, 48 Stat. 1103-04 (1934).
("[N]o person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and
divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect or meaning of such
intercepted communication to any person .... ").
46 Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 381-83 (1937).
47 See, e.g., Sablowsky v. United States, 101 F.2d 183, 185 (3d Cir. 1938) (reversing the
conviction of the appellants based on evidence of over 1,500 intercepted phone calls intro-
duced at trial); Diamond v. United States, 108 F.2d 859, 860 (6th Cir. 1938) (holding that
the federal government was incorrect in asserting that since "only four or five" of the 150
intercepted calls were interstate, the Communications Act prohibition on interception did
not apply).
48 Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939).
49 Id. at 324.
[Vol. 18
Who Let the Katz Out?
office." As a result of the wiretap, seventy-six conversations were admitted
into evidence against the defendants." Three of the defendants pled guilty and
agreed to testify for the government." At trial, the remaining defendants were
found guilty. 3
On appeal, the defendants argued that section 605 of the Communications
Act barred the admission of the phone calls into evidence. 4 The government
urged the Court to hold that section 605 did not apply to intrastate communica-
tions, and that, even if it did, the divulgence of the messages was within the
consent requirement since the defendants helped to correct the transcripts and
testified to their content.5
After examining the language, structure, and legislative history of section
605, the court rejected the government's argument that section 605 did not ap-
ply to intrastate communications. 6 It concluded that the "the broad and inclu-
sive language of the second clause of the section is not to be limited by con-
struction so as to exclude intrastate communications from the protection
against interception and divulgence."57 The Court also rejected the govern-
ment's consent argument because "[t]he Act contemplates voluntary consent
and not enforced agreement to publication." 8 Because the defendants only
learned about the wiretaps after they were indicted, the Court held their con-
sent was involuntarily made. 9 Weiss provided two principles that have perme-
ated subsequent wiretapping policy: the federal government has jurisdiction
over wiretapping,' and consent must be given voluntarily prior to the wiretap-
ping for the evidence to be admissible.6
The Supreme Court resolved the question of whether only one or both par-
ties need to provide consent in Rathbun v. United States.62 In Rathbun, a law
enforcement officer received prior consent from one party to a telephone con-
versation, but not the other party, to listen in to a telephone conversation in
5o Id at 325.
51 Id.
52 Id at 324. One defendant even assisted prosecutors in correcting the accuracy of the
stenographic transcript prior to trial. Id.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 326.
55 Id. at 326-27.
56 Id. at 328-29.
57 Id. at 329. The Court noted the petitioner's argument that section 605 did not seek to
exclude intrastate calls from protection because a person wiretapping a telephone line can-
not distinguish between intrastate and interstate communications. Id. at 328.
58 Weiss, 308 U.S. at 330.
59 Id.
60 See FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 15, § 4:14, 4-22.
61 Id. at § 5:1-2, 5-7; Weiss, 308 U.S. at 330.
62 Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107 (1957).
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which the defendant threatened the life of another.63 The defendant argued that
section 605 required the consent of both parties to divulge the contents of those
communications." The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that "[e]ach party to
a telephone conversation takes the risk that the other party may have an exten-
sion telephone and may allow another to overhear the conversation."65 The
concept of one-party consent is critical to understanding what expectation of
privacy an individual may have when having a conversation using any com-
munications medium; a person always assumes the risk that the other person
may be a government agent or working with the government.66
Congress replaced the Communications Act's one-sentence provision in sec-
tion 605 with a comprehensive federal wiretapping statute when it passed Title
III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.67 The statute
prohibited the interception of oral and wire communications without a war-
rant.68
In 1986, Congress updated the federal wiretapping laws to include electronic
communications and stored communications with the passage of the ECPA and
the SCA.69 In 1994, Congress passed the Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act ("CALEA") to keep federal wiretapping statutes current with
rapidly changing communications technology.7" The primary goal of CALEA
63 Rathbun, 355 U.S. at 108.
64 Id. at 108-11.
65 Id. at 11l. Congress incorporated this holding into the federal wiretapping statutes:
"It shall not be unlawful ... for a person acting under color of law to intercept a wire, oral,
or electronic communication, where such person is a party to the communication or one of
the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception." 18 U.S.C. §
2511(2)(c) (2006). See also FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 15, § 5:12 at 5-29 (noting
that some states have stricter standards than federal laws on when law enforcement officers
can listen in on such conversations).
66 Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 303 (1966).
67 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat.
212 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (2006)).
68 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)-(2). However, it also created a specific exemption for the presi-
dent to make warrantless wiretaps within his constitutional authority for foreign intelligence
gathering and "to protect the United States against the overthrow of the Government by
force or other unlawful means, or against any other clear and present danger to the structure
or existence of the Government." § 2511(3). In 1972, the Supreme Court held that the presi-
dent does not have the constitutional authority to perform warrantless domestic wiretaps
under the "clear and present danger" test, United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S.
297, 321-22 (1972), but the decision left open the question of whether the same rule applied
to foreign wiretaps. Id. at 321-22.
69 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848
(1986). See infra Part Ill and accompanying text.
70 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108
Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 1001-10 (2006)) and in scattered sections of 18
U.S.C.). See Susan Landau, National Security on the Line, 4 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L.
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was to preserve the ability of law enforcement officers to receive wiretapped
communications from surveillance targets in light of evolving communications
technologies.71 Congress paid for the modifications and expansions necessary
for common carriers to provide these wiretaps." CALEA defined a telecom-
munications carrier as a "person or entity engaged in the transmission or
switching of wire or electronic communications as a common carrier for hire.
Examples of telecommunications carriers in the committee report included:
local exchange carriers, interexchange carriers, competitive access providers (CAPs),
cellular carriers, providers of personal communications services (PCS), satellite-based
service providers, cable operators and electric or other utilities that provide telecom-
munications services for hire to the public, and any other common carrier that offers
wire or wireless service for hire to the public.74
CALEA also intended to exclude information services," described as "elec-
tronic mail [and] on-line services providers, such as Compuserve, Prodigy,
[and] America-On-line . . ." from the definition of a telecommunications car-
rier.76 Finally, CALEA gave the FCC the authority to designate any service
provider as a telecommunications carrier if the Commission determined it was
in the public interest. 7
B. Modem Communication Mediums
1. The Traditional Wiretap of an Analog Communication
The basic premise of Bell's telephone still exists today: two wires, one for
transmission and one for reception, run from a source to its destination in an
409, 410 (2006) ("As telecommunications technology changed, law enforcement sought to
keep the law current, and . . .[CALEA was] passed. In requiring that digitally-switched
telephone networks be designed in accordance with federally-specified wiretapping stan-
dards, CALEA substantively changed the way telecommunications equipment was devel-
oped and deployed.").
71 H.R. REP. No. 103-827, at 9-10 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3489, 3492-
93.
72 FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMMUNICATIONS AssIs-
TANCE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT ACT: SECOND ANN. REP. TO CONGRESS 2 (1996) (providing
that Congress authorized $500 million to telecommunications carriers for fiscal years 1995
through 1998 to pay for "all reasonable costs directly associated with the modifications
performed by carriers in connection with equipment, facilities, and services ... to establish
the capabilities necessary to comply with [sections of] CALEA.").
73 47 U.S.C. § 1001(8).
74 H.R. REP. No. 103-827, at 20 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3489, 3500.
75 See 47 U.S.C. § 1001(8)(C).
76 H.R. REP. No. 103-827, at 20 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3489, 3500.
77 47 U.S.C. § 1001(8)(B)(ii).
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unbroken link."8 The transmission wire transfers the electrical signal created by
the pressure of the voice against the microphone to the speaker, which converts
the electrical impulses back into sound.79 Therefore, in order to have a two-way
communication, one wire connects each microphone to the opposite speaker."0
This basic premise is an oversimplification of the modem Public Switched
Telephone Network ("PSTN"), which uses "circuit-switched" systems to
transmit from source to destination."' The main advantage of the PSTN is the
ability to connect a subscriber to any phone in the world on the network." This
is possible with the use of centralized hubs, 3 which automatically transfer the
electrical current of calls to other hubs and switches until it reaches the destina-
tion. 4 Under CALEA, once law enforcement officials obtain a wiretap order
from a judge allowing them to monitor a telephone call, the PSTN can be used
to relay the call to the surveillance target, as well as to the government agent.85
2. The Modern Wiretap of a Digital Communication
Modem communications use a global interconnected web of digital net-
works called the Internet. 6 The Internet functions like a courier: small seg-
ments of code, called packets, travel between computers. 7 All packets contain
a small piece of code that references a protocol. These protocols are standards
78 See LAWRENCE HARTE, TELECOM BASICS 116-17 (3rd ed. 2004).
79 See id. at 116.
80 Id. at 116-17.
81 See OLIVER C. IBE, CONVERGED NETWORK ARCHITECTURES: DELIVERING VOICE AND
DATA OVER IP, ATM, AND FRAME RELAY 12 (2002). PSTN networks typically follow a five-
class hierarchy. A class five hub would be in a local office in a section of a city or town
while a class one regional hub connects to an international gateway for long distance call-
ing. A phone call to a neighbor uses the class five hub. However, if someone were to place a
call to someone in another region the call would climb up the hierarchy to an idle class one
regional center. See id.
82 See id
83 See HARRY NEWTON, NEWTON's TELECOM DICTIONARY 568 (25th ed. 2009) (defining a
hub as "[t]he point on a network where circuits are connected.").
84 See Ibe, supra note 81, at 12.
85 See Timothy Singleton, Big Brother Hears You, But Can He Understand What He
Hears? The Problematic Application of CALEA to VolP Communications in the Age of En-
cryption, 15 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 283, 297-98 (2008).
86 See TIM BERNERS-LEE & MARK FISCHETrI, WEAVING THE WEB: THE ORIGINAL DE-
SIGN AND ULTIMATE DESTINY OF THE WORLD WIDE WEB BY ITS INVENTOR 6 (1999).
87 See JAMES GILLIES & ROBERT CAILLIAU, HOW THE WEB WAS BORN: THE STORY OF
THE WORLD WIDE WEB 4-6 (2000).
88 See Keith E. Witek, Software Patent Infringement on the Internet and on Modern
Computer Systems - Who is Liable for Damages?, 14 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 303, 346 (1998).
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set by the Internet Engineering Task Force ("IETF").89 For example, a protocol
is like the information contained on a standard envelope containing the source,
destination, and routing information. ° There is great flexibility on what a pro-
tocol may contain, but the IETF has established international standards that
allow computers throughout the world to interpret a data packet's header in-
formation.9"
A digital wiretap uses a program called a network analyzer to copy some or
all of the packets from a given computer or network.92 The network analyzer
can be configured to look for certain protocols and will make copies of the data
packets as the tapped computer receives them. 3 These copies are sent back to
the tapper's computer for recompilation and analysis.94 For example, to wiretap
e-mail communications, a sophisticated network analyzer will read the header
information on all of the packets, and those that reference one of the many
types of common e-mail transport protocols will be copied, while others are
discarded.95
The FBI's former network analyzer, Carnivore, allowed it to capture as de-
tailed or narrow of a field of information as necessary from those users' com-
89 Internet Engineering Task Force, Mission Statement,
http://www.ietf.org/about/mission.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2010). The IETF seeks to "make
the Internet work better by producing high quality, relevant technical documents that influ-
ence the way people design, use, and manage the Internet." Id. It is important to that al-
though the IETF "makes standards that are often adopted by Internet users ... it does not
control, or even patrol, the Internet. Paul Hoffman & Susan Harris, The Tao IETF: A Nov-
ice's Guide to the Internet Engineering Task Force, Sept. 2006,
http://www.ietforg/rfc/rfc4677.txt (last visited Jan. 9, 2010).
90 See GILLIES & CALLIAU, supra note 87, at 4-5.
91 See Internet Engineering Task Force, The IETF Standards Process,
http://www.ietf.org/about/standards-process.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2010). Protocols are
key to modem communication privacy because every destination and sub-destination reads
the protocol for routing, tracking, and filtering purposes. The information contained within
this header is dependent on the content, transmission method, and other factors that allow
then network to properly route the information between two computers and traverse fire-
walls. BEHROUZ A. FOROUZAN, TCP/IP PROTOCOL SUITE §§ 11.1-6, 12.1-11 (2006). A fire-
wall may be either a hardware or software component that works like a gatekeeper by ana-
lyzing the header information and deciding to accept or reject the packet. Id. at § 28.7. It is
through these properly configured firewalls that users maintain their privacy from unwanted
communications by hackers and wiretappers.
92 See ALFRED BASTA & WOLF HALTON, COMPUTER SECURITY AND PENETRATION TEST-
ING 69-80 (2008); see also Xiaomin Huang et al., Computer Crime, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REv.
285, 289 n.20 (2007).
93 See BASTA & HALTON, supra note 92, at 69-80.
94 See id.
95 See Robert A. Pikowsky, The Need for Revisions to the Law of Wiretapping and In-
terception of Email, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 1, 77 (2003) (describing the




puters under surveillance.96 Carnivore would capture all information flowing
from the user's computer to the user's Internet service provider ("ISP") and
then filter out information that was not included in the warrant.97 This informa-
tion was stored and transmitted to an FBI computer and then examined by fed-
eral agents.98 The National Security Agency ("NSA") uses a more expansive
system, a highly classified network analyzer called Echelon.99 This system in-
volves a tap at communications portals, including international telecommuni-
cations satellites ("Intellisats"), "undersea cables, land-based microwave net-
works, and regional telecommunications satellites.""1° Echelon splits the infor-
mation collected into encrypted and unencrypted streams.' The encrypted
streams are then decrypted and join the unencrypted streams at a supercom-
puter, which analyzes the communications key words or phrases and alerts
NSA operators to any potentially dangerous content.0 2
3. Merging the Phone Company with the Internet
In 1995, software developers created Voice over Internet Protocol ("VoIP")
to transmit phone calls digitally over the Internet."3 Using high-speed Internet
access, a VoIP user can communicate across the office or across the world
without incurring long distance or per-minute usage charges."° The technology
can be either hardware or software interfaces that converts phone conversa-
tions into data packets, which are then transmitted through the Internet. 5
The difference between the VoIP and the PSTN networks is similar to the
difference between trains and cars. In a traditional PSTN system, a physical
wire connects two points for the duration of the phone call. 6 This method is
like a long train moving between two points and occupying the entire length of
the track for the duration of the trip. VoIP communication takes that same
length of train and splits it into millions of tiny cars that travel on a massive
96 PRESTON GRALLA, HOW THE INTERNET WORKS 373 (8th ed. 2007) (noting that while the




oo See id. at 374-75.
'o Id. at 375.
102 Id.
103 See Amy L. Leisinger, Note, If it Looks Like a Duck: The Need for Regulatory Parity
in VolP Telephony, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 585, 587-89 (2006).
104 See DAVID GREENBLATT, THE CALL HEARD 'ROUND THE WORLD: VOICE OVER INTER-
NET PROTOCOL AND THE QUEST FOR CONVERGENCE 61-63 (2003).
10' JAMES E. GASKIN, TALK IS CHEAP: SWITCHING TO INTERNET TELEPHONES 11-14
(2005).
106 See Harte, supra note 78, at 116.
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interconnected web of highways. The cars all know where they are going, and
in what order they need to arrive, but take the quickest-not necessarily the
most direct-path. While traveling, other packets (i.e., e-mail messages, Web
sites, downloads, streaming radio) can merge into and out of the data string
creating a continuous transmission scalable up to the width and number of the
highways-bandwidth.° 7
Traditional VoIP providers have a central server that facilitates phone
calls."0 8 When a VoIP-enabled telephone is used to dial a phone number, the
central server will interpret the dialed digits like the way physical switches
would in the traditional PSTN. 9 The central server then redirects the call
through the Internet to either another subscriber's VoIP phone or to a local
switching station for a phone connected to the PSTN." 0 Once the call is redi-
rected, the individual VoIP software communicates directly without interfacing
the central server."' If the connection is to a non-VoIP telephone number, then
a central server will facilitate the VoIP call and convert it into an analog call
that interfaces with the PSTN." While many traditional VoIP providers claim
to be "a revolutionary breakthrough in the history of human communications,"
they are actually "only an improvement.., in the technical world.""' 3
4. Decentralized Digital Communications with Skype
One new revolutionary communication technology, Skype, is unique be-
cause it uses a modified version of a peer-to-peer (P2P) network,"4 called Ka-
zaa." '5 P2P networks were most famously used by Napster and Grokster to
share music files that violated copyright laws."6 Skype uses two different types
107 See Marc Elzweig, D, None of the Above: On the FCC Approach to VolP Regulation,
2008 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 489,494-96 (2008).
108 See GASKIN, supra note 105, at 25.
'09 See id.
110 See id. at 24, 29.
Il See GRALLA, supra note 96, at 121-23.
112 Id. at 123.
"13 GASKIN, supra note 105, at 25.
114 See HARRY NEWTON, NEWTON'S TELECOM DICTIONARY 847 (25th ed. 2009) (defining
a peer-to-peer network as a network "in which every node has equal access to the network
and can send and receive data at any time without having to wait for permission from a con-
trol mode.").
"5 ANDREW SHEPPARD, SKYPE HACKS: TIPS & TOOLS FOR CHEAP, FUN, INNOVATIVE
PHONE SERVICE 1 (2006) ("Using P2P technology means that Skype runs on a mesh of inter-
connected PCs spread across the global Internet ....").
116 See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1101 (9th Cir. 2001); MGM
Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 921-22 (2005).
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of computers: nodes and super nodes."17 A node is a computer on a network
that is running the Skype software, and a super node is a node that is "nomi-
nated . . . to take on some of the administrative and coordinating activities of
[the] network."'" 8
The Skype network exists by and for the users and is free of charge for all of
the users on the network."9 Unlike a PSTN, which works on a five-layer hub-
and-spoke network,'20 Skype uses a three-layer Web structure. 2' The first layer
is all of the nodes that talk to the super nodes in the second layer, which handle
"some of the administrative and coordinating activities of its P2P network."' 22
The individual nodes then can directly communicate with other nodes inde-
pendent of the super-nodes.'23 The third layer functions like a traditional VolP
provider: a central server that completes the connection between the Skype
user and the PSTN.'
24
Skype differs from most forms of modem communication in a critical way:
voice communications over Skype are decentralized. 2 In a PSTN, if a hub is
inoperable, all dependant spokes also become inoperable unless supported by a
117 SHEPPARD, Supra note 115, at 2.
118 Id. Skype has not released the software rules that designate how a computer becomes
a super node, but Skype's Web site explains the advantage of this type of super node net-
work structure over more traditional P2P technology introduced by Kazaa:
P2P network technologies used by file-sharing applications would be almost suitable
for decentralizing [Skype], but those networks are fragmented in nature - a search does
not reach all nodes in the network. Clearly, in order to deliver high quality telephony
with the lowest possible costs, a third generation of P2P technology ("3G P2P"), or
Global Index (GI) was a necessary development and represents yet another paradigm
shift in the notion of scalable networks. The Global Index technology is a multi-tiered
network where supernodes communicate in such a way that every node in the network
has full knowledge of all available users and resources with minimal latency.
Skype, P2P Telephony Explained - For Geeks Only,
http://www.skype.com/help/guides/p2pexplained/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2010) [P2P Telephony
Explained].
119 See SHEPPARD, supra note 115, at 3.
120 IBE, supra note 81, at 12-13. Traditional PSTN networks typically follow a five-class
geographic hierarchy. A class five hub connects the individual phones to a local office. Fol-
lowing predetermined routing procedures, this local office will either connect a phone call to
another phone connected to that local office, or pass the call to regional and long distance
hubs in the hierarchy. Eventually, the call will be passed back to a local office that will
complete the circuit to the call recipient. Id.
121 Cf SHEPPARD, supra note 115, at 2-3.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 3.
124 See GRALLA, supra note 96, at 122-23.
125 See SHEPPARD, supra note 115, at 2, 4; see also Samuel Korpi, Internet Telephony -
Security Issues in Skype § 1.3 (Spring 2006) (unpublished dissertation, Helsinki University
of Technology), available at http://www.tml.tkk.fi/Publications/C/21/Korpi-ready.pdf.
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direct link to another hub. 26 In Skype's network, the destruction of any single
super node results in the promotion of the computer with the next highest
available bandwidth to replace it.' For this reason, the software is self-
sustaining as long as it is being used.
The popularity of Skype is widespread. In 2009, Skype earned $551 million
in revenue and boasted 405 million registered users. 28 Many products have
helped to bridge the gap between a traditional phone and the computer-based
Skype software, while some manufactures have even created Internet phones
that integrate directly with the Skype network without the need for a com-
puter.'29 Also, many smart phones 3" have the ability to use Skype software to
make phone calls,' and Verizon Wireless is the first cell phone carrier to fully
support Skype calls on most of their new smart phones.' 2 The popularity of
Skype will continue to push new technologies to expand the usefulness of
Skype style services into completely integrated Web-based applications.'33 In
126 See IBE, supra note 81, at 12-13 (2002). Due to the sophistication of the modem
PSTN network, it would take more than one of the higher class hubs (one through four) to
bring down the entire network. Id.
127 See IAN J. TAYLOR & ANDREW HARRISON, FROM P2P AND GRIDS TO SERVICES ON THE
WEB § 11.2.3, at 208 (2nd. ed. 2009).
128 Gabriel Madway, Skype Founders Sue eBay, Investors, REUTERS, Sept. 17, 2009,
http://www.reuters.com/article/idustre58f5xc20090917. Skype earns revenue by charging by
the minute for phone calls between software and PSTN phones or cell phones. Press Re-
lease, Skype, Skype Available on Apple App Store (March 31, 2009),
http://about.skype.com/2009/03/skypeavailableon appleapp_s.html.
129 See, e.g., Posting of Peter Rojas, The Skype Phones of CES, to ENGADGET,
http://www.engadget.com /2007/01/12/ the-skype-phones-of-ces/ (Jan. 12, 2007, 8:52 EST);
Press Release, Belkin, Make Free Unlimited SkypeTM Calls Without a Computer with Bel-
kin's New Desktop Internet Phone for Skype (Jan. 7, 2008),
http://www.belkin.com/pressroom/releases/uploads/01_0708DesktoplntemetPhoneSkype.h
tml.
130 PEI ZHENG & LIONEL M. Ni, SMART PHONE & NEXT GENERATION MOBILE COMPUTING
§ 1.1.1.3 at 4-5 (2006) (stating that a smart phone is a cell phone that, in addition to making
voice calls, can "facilitate data access and processing with significant computing power ....
[A] smart phone usually provides personal information management (PIM) applications and
some wireless communications capability. Roughly speaking, a smart phone is like a small,
networked computer in the form of a cell phone.").
'31 See, e.g., Press Release, Skype, Skype Coming to BlackBerry Smartphones in May
(Mar. 31, 2009), http://about.skype.com/2009/03/skypecomingtoblackberrysma.html
(last visited Nov. 6, 2009); Posting of Jessica Dolcourt, Skype for iPhone: It's Official, to
CNET.COM, http://reviews.cnet.com/8301-12261_7-10206786-51.html (Mar. 29, 2009, 00:27
EST).
132 See Press Release, Verizon Wireless, Skype Mobile For Verizon Wireless Available
Thursday: Companies Deliver Expansive Global Calling Community and Free Skype-to-
Skype Calls on the Most Reliable Wireless Network in the United States (Mar. 23, 2010),
available at http://news.vzw.com/news/2010/03/pr2OlO-03-23a.html.
133 See, e.g., Mark Gibbs, Ribbit Offers an Open Alternative to Skype, NETWORK WORLD,
Dec. 19, 2007, available at
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short, Skype is becoming less like a computer phenomenon for geeks and more
like the telephone sitting on the nightstand.
5. Taking Digital Communications to the Next Level with Instant Messaging
Instant messaging ("IM") began on isolated university networks and was de-
signed to transmit an instantaneous message to another computer on the net-
work.'34 The first successful introduction of IM technology was a program
called ICQ, an acronym for "I seek you," that focused on creating peer-to-peer
communities.'35 As the Internet grew into community-based networks, IM
technology was offered as a feature of certain subscription services.'36 A new
generation of instant messaging applications has evolved to not only transmit
text, but also images, documents, voice, and even video.'37
Americans are also increasingly using IM services with devices other than a
personal computer. A recent study by the Pew Internet & American Life Pro-
ject found that seventy percent of Internet users fifty years or younger use
more than one device to access the Internet. 138 Through these devices, users
increasingly access social networking Web sites ("SNWs") to send text mes-
sages or IMs. The Pew study found that fifty-eight percent of teenage users of
SNWs send text messages or IMs through these sites. 39 In short, IM has be-
come "part of the fabric of our daily lives .... ""'
IM services thrive on the size of their membership. The more people use a
specific platform for instant messaging, the more likely they will recruit others
to join that platform.'4 ' IM applications are often free to download and use after
a user registers some basic information.'42 Typically, this information is not
http://www.networkworld.com/newsletters/web/2007/1217web2.html.
134 JOHN W. R1TTINGHOUSE & JAMES F. RANSOME, IM INSTANT MESSAGING SECURITY §
1.3.1, at 3 (2005).
135 Id. at 3-4.
136 Id. at 4.
137 Id. at § 2.2, at 40. See John N. Titley, Comment, Real-Time Confusion: Classifying
Instant Messages Under Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
1177, 1180-81 (2006).
138 AMANDA LENHART ET AL., PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, SOCIAL MEDIA
& MOBILE INTERNET USE AMONG TEENS AND YOUNG ADULTS 14 (2010),
http://pewintemet.org/-/media//Files/Reports/201 0/PIPSocialMedia and YoungAdults_
Report.pdf.
131 Id. at 20.
140 RITTINGHOUSE & RANSOME, supra note 134, at § 1.3, at 8.
141 See Matthew A. Goldberg, Message in a Bottleneck: The Need for FCC-Mandated
Interoperability Among Instant Messaging Providers, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 133,
136-37 (2005).
142 RiTTINGHOUSE & RANSOME, supra note 134, at § 2.1.1, at 33-34. One of the reasons
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verified, allowing for relatively anonymous communication. After registering,
the user will connect to the IM chat server and begin using the service.'43
A user is then able to initiate individual or group chats.'" Other members of
the community may initiate a chat with the user in separate dialog boxes that
display that communication.'45 The user can have multiple individual or group
chats simultaneously.'46 While some users may think that their chats are only
visible to them and the party they are communicating with, most IM communi-
cations are transmitted and stored on the IM provider's central server.'47
Another prominent IM service is Google Talk, which uses an open source
protocol called XMPP for its Web-based IM application.' This open source
protocol functions using the server-client model with encryption built around a
streaming core.'4 9 Compare this structure to a public water utility where water
is retrieved from an aquifer by a central pumping station, treated and purified,
and then forwarded to its destination inside pipes designed to protect the water
from contamination. In this context, the IM chat server is the central pumping
station and the aquifer is an IM user registered with the network. The server
logs and retransmits the message to the destination inside encrypted streams.
150
In addition to personal use, businesses utilize IM services, employing in-
house and customer service-based IM applications for employees and clients. 5'
for the success of IM is the fact that it is a "client-driven" communications service in that
"[a]ny user can download a client, configure a user account, and be up and running in min-
utes." Id. at § 7.1, at 196. This is contrasted with e-mail, which requires a server configura-
tion before an individual can receive communications. Id.
143 See id. at § 2.1, at 33-36.
144 See 7 Things You Should Know About Instant Messaging, EDUCAUSE LEARNING
INITIATIVE (EDUCAUSE, Boulder, CO), Nov. 2005,
http://net.educause.edu/ir/library/pdf/ELI7008.pdf.
145 See id.
146 See GRALLA, supra note 96, at 113.
147 See, e.g., AOL, AIM Privacy Policy, http://www.aim.com/tos/privacy-policy.adp
(last visited Feb. 19, 2010) (AOL Instant Messenger reports that it will display the contents
of a user's IMs and personally identifiable information in response to:
legal process (for example, a court order, search warrant or subpoena), or in other cir-
cumstances in which AOL has a good faith belief that AIM or AOL are being used for
unlawful purposes. AOL may also access or disclose your AIM information when nec-
essary to protect the rights or property of AIM or AOL, or in special cases such as a
threat to your safety or that of others.
Id.
148 See Google, Google Talk for Developers,
http://code.google.com/apis/talk/open communications.html (last visited Feb. 8,2010).
149 XMPP, Summary of XMPP, http://xmpp.org/about/summary.shtml (last visited Feb.
8, 2010).
150 XMPP, Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP): Core, XML Streams,
http://xmpp.org/rfcs/rfc3920.html#streams (last visited Feb. 26, 2010).
151 See RITT1NGHOUSE & RANSOME, supra note 134, at § 7.1, at 195-99 (noting that ad-
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6. Creating New Forms of Digital Communications with Social Networking
Web Sites
SNWs are "virtual communities on the Internet" where people are provided
a forum for communication to share backgrounds, interests, and hobbies.'52
Beginning in 1997, SixDegrees.com developed the first Web site that today
would be recognized as a SNW.' The site provided the ability to construct a
user profile, develop a "friends" list, and explore other users' friends lists to
make more connections.'54 With the Internet boom in the late 1990s, SixDe-
grees.com grew to several million people but failed to develop a sustainable
business model.' The service was before its time but not by far. Between 1997
and 2001, many Web sites attempted to tap the SNW market, all offering dif-
ferent interfaces and features, but none found the right mix of features, mem-
bership, and profitability until Facebook.'56
Today, Facebook is one of the most popular SNWs, especially among
younger people. 5 7 Facebook launched in 2004 and was originally only avail-
able to students at Harvard University before later expanding to other universi-
ties, high schools, corporate entities, and eventually to the public at large.' In
early 2008, within five years of its launch, Facebook reached 150 million us-
ers, and now has over 400 million users.'59 By July 2009, Facebook was the
vantages include "phone cost savings," "back-channel .communications" during conference
calls, immediate communications in no talk environments, emergency communications,
team bonding, "find-me-wherever-I-am service" to transmit messages from a IM application
to a mobile IM application seamlessly, "expertise on demand," and self service "person-to-
machine queries").
152 Ian Bymside, Six Clicks of Separation: The Legal Ramifications of Employers Using
Social Networking Sites to Research Applicants, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 445, 453-54
(2008).
'53 Danah M. Boyd & Nicole B. Ellison, Social Network Sites: Definition, History, and




156 See id. (discussing SNWs that were not successful); see Posting of Nisan Gabbay,
Facebook Case Study: Offline Behavior Drives Online Usage, to Startup Review,
http://www.startup-review.com/blog/facebook-case-study-offline-behavior-drives-online-
usage.php (Nov. 5, 2006) (describing why Facebook's model succeeded); Posting of MG
Siegler, Facebook Crosses 300 Million Users. Oh Yeah, And They Just Went Cash Positive,
to TechCrunch, http://techcrunch.com/2009/09/15/facebook-crosses-300-million-users-oh-
yeah-and-their-cash-flow-just-went-positive/ (Sept. 15, 2009).
157 See Quantcast, Facbook.com-Quantcast Audience Profile,
http://www.quantcast.com/facebook.com (last visited Apr. 16, 2010) (providing that ap-
proximately 125 million people in the United States accessed Facebook in February 2010).
158 Boyd & Ellison, supra note 153, at 218.
159 Facebook, Facebook - Statistics, http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics
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fourth most-trafficked Web site in the United States.' 6
Facebook's broad appeal derives from the site allowing users to easily share
information about themselves to a customizable audience. Users can create and
share their own profiles with their personal information, such as their photos,
activities, interests, music, television shows, movies, books, and quotations.
6
This allows users to keep up with old friends and even find new friends with
common interests.
SNWs like Facebook have shifted from the "foggy vision of geeks" to the
baby boom generation with incredible speed.'62 With the influx of multigenera-
tional adopters of Facebook and other SNWs, business have sought to tap the
opportunity to establish or expand brand recognition and online sales. 63 For
example, Grapekillers, a group of Washington state wineries, created a Face-
book page and quickly had 1,500 fans."6 From Facebook advertising alone,
Grapekillers can pack their showroom for a weekend release of a new bottle of
wine.' 65 In short, SNWs are a powerful communication tool.
7. Voice Communications 3.0
IMs are a great communications tool for two or three individuals, but group
chats quickly become overbearing. Because of the delay in the conversation,
participants do not know when to type and when to read. The result is a con-
tinuous stream of delayed text responses on multiple subjects with no clear
purpose or direction. Group chatting in this environment is often confusing and
unproductive and has not been adopted as a serious or legitimate form of
communication. However, one startup company has a new way to chat that
could change that.
TinyChat is a free text, video, audio, and desktop conferencing site where
users do not need to sign up for an account, download any software, or have
(last visited March 26, 2010).
160 David Samo, Facebook Reports Milestones in Cash Flow, Users, L.A. TIMES, Sept.
16, 2009, at B4.
161 See Helen W. Gunnarsson, Law and Technology: Twitter and Linkedin and Face-
book, Oh My!, 97 ILL. B.J. 288, 290 (2009).
162 See Kevin Patrick Allen, Ecommerce Know-How: Four Keys to Twitter, Facebook





165 Id. See also Christopher J. Bucholtz, Social CRM: Size Matters, ECOMMERCE TIMES,
Nov. 3, 2009, http://www.ecommercetimes.com/rsstory/68537.html (stating that small busi-
nesses may be best able to utilize social networking sites).
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any technical skill in order to use the site.66 TinyChat has received critical ac-
claim for its "dead-simple service" with uses ranging from "offering a simple
way to chat with your less-than-tech-savvy friends, to skirting corporate fire-
walls that block typical instant message protocols." '167 A user can start a new
chat room by adding a forward slash and a unique name to the end of the Ti-
nyChat URL: typing the address http://tinychat.com/newchatroom will create a
chat room called "newchatroom." which can then be shared with whoever the
room creator chooses. 6 When a user first accesses the TinyChat Web site,
they are prompted to create a unique usemame. 69 This nickname identifies the
individual's contributions to the chat room but does not necessarily identify the
individual. After creating their nickname, the user can see up to 12 simultane-
ous audio-video Webcam streams and over 100 chat participants' text mes-
sages. 7°
While the true value of the TinyChat system lies in the need for reliable,
easy, and cheap video conferencing, the applicability of the technology under-
lying the service has broad application across industries. The future of voice
communications will continue to shake off the requirements for computers,
personally identifying registrations and platform specific protocols in favor of
universally available, cross platform, and very simple Web and phone applica-
tions. 7'
8. The Next Generation's Phone Call
The next generation will likely have a completely different conception of
what it means to make a phone call, and of the underlying technology that
makes the phone call possible. Ribbit, which claims to be "Silicon Valley's
166 See Posting of Ben Par, Forget Skype: TinyChat Launches Dead-Simple Video Chat,
to Mashable, http://mashable.com/2009/O9/30/tinychat-p2p (Sept. 30, 2009); see generally
TinyChat, http://www.tinychat.com (last visited Nov. 6, 2009). Tinychat does allow the
room creator the option of requiring authentication with a Twitter or Facebook account. Id.
167 Scott Gilbertson, TinyChat: Disposable, Web-Based Chat Anyone Can Use, WIRED,
Feb. 19, 2009, http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2009/02/tinychat-dispos. See also Leena
Rao, Virtual Chat Room TinyChat Adds Video Conferencing and Screen Sharing, TECH-
CRUNCH, May 27, 2009, http://www.techcrunch.com/2009/05/27/virtual-chat-room-
tinychat-adds-video-conferencing-and-screen-sharing/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2010) ("The vid-
eo conferencing feature is very easy to use and the quality of the video isn't terrible.").
168 See Leena Rao, Virtual Chat Room TinyChat Adds Video Conferencing and Screen
Sharing, TECHCRUNCH, May 27, 2009, http://www.techcrunch.com/2009/05/27/virtual-chat-
room-tinychat-adds-video-conferencing-and-screen-sharing.
169 See Tinychat, http://www.tinychat.com (last visited Nov. 6, 2009).
170 Posting of admin, Tinychat V2 is Live!, to Tiny Chat Blog,
http://tinychatblog.com/tinychat-v2-is-live/ (May 27, 2009).
171 See RITriNGHOUSE & RANSOME, supra NOTE 134, § 8.1 at 209-10, § 8.5 at 214-15.
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First Phone Company," is taking the next step in voice communications away
from the traditional PSTN model.'72 The company has created a free develop-
ment platform that allows two-way voice integration for any Web site without
the need to install additional software.'73 With this new technology, the future
of voice communications is limited only by the imagination of Web develop-
ers.1
74
Ribbit recently sponsored a development challenge that gave application de-
velopers free reign with the development platform to create their most innova-
tive work. 75 Out of 150 applications developed by 500 programmers in thirty
countries, "6 the winning five applications show the power of the new platform
for voice on the Internet. The application that won the grand prize--called Lu-
cid Viewer-integrated the Ribbit voice module with mapping and street view
capabilities to produce "a new mapping and communication experience."'
7
With Lucid Viewer, a user will be able to virtually walk down a street and call,
using their computer's microphone and headset, or send a text message to an
individual merchant's telephone number by clicking on a button that hovers
over a picture of the merchant's storefront. "' Other applications include Rib-
bit's self-developed Salesforce application, which creates text transcripts of
voicemails and can even be used to log and process customers' voice mes-
sages.'79 With technology like Ribbit's employed through the Internet, the dif-
ference between a phone call and electronic communications virtually disap-
pears.
172 Ribbit Corporation, http://www.ribbit.com (last visited Nov. 6, 2009).
173 See Press Release, Ribbit, Silicon Valley's "First Phone Company" Triples the Size
of its Developer Community (Dec. 21, 2007),
http://www.ribbit.com/news/releases/122107.php.
174 In 2008, British Telecommunications purchased Ribbit's voice service for $105 mil-
lion. Press Release, Ribbit, BT Acquires Ribbit (Dec. 21, 2007),
http://www.ribbit.com/news/releases/072908.php. Ted Griggs, Chief Executive of Ribbit,
noted the significance of the acquisition:
The communications industry is entering a new phase. Closed networks are becoming
open platforms and developers are now driving innovation. By adding Ribbit's capabil-
ity to the power of BT's global 21CN platform, we will now be able to give the devel-
opment community the tools they need to innovate on a global scale.
Id.
175 Camille Ricketts, Ribbit Announces Winners of its "Killer" Mobile Apps Competi-





179 See Ribbit for Salesforce - What is It?, http://www.ribbit.com/crm/salesforce/what-is-
it.php (last visited March 17, 2010).
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III. THE STRUCTURE OF FEDERAL WIRETAPPING LAWS
A. Electronic Communications Privacy Act
With the ECPA, Congress sought to provide more stringent protections to
the contents of modem electronic communications from unauthorized and un-
warranted interception. 8 ' The ECPA expanded the reach of the federal wiretap
provisions under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
of 1968 to include new forms of electronic communications technology.' The
ECPA wanted a sufficiently wide net to allow courts to protect private conver-
sations from the piercing eyes of their government, the pilfering tendencies of
corporate competitors,'82 and the idle temptations of the technically savvy.
However, courts have found that the Fourth Amendment provides little privacy
protection to technological information exposed to the public.'83
The ECPA's operating prohibition reads: "any person who ... intentionally
intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or
endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication ... shall be
[criminally] punished ... or shall be subject to [civil] suit."'" A criminal pun-
ishment may include fines or up to five years imprisonment.'85 Civil penalties
may include injunctive or declaratory relief, and damages of at least $10,000.86
The statute explicitly exempts from this prohibition individuals who perform
maintenance or quality control checks on the service or are acting under the
color of law with prior authorization.'87
In order for law enforcement to obtain a wiretap, they must apply for an ex
parte order from a judge within the jurisdiction where the wiretap will be per-
180 S. REP. No. 99-541, at 1 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3555.
181 See id. at 1-3.
182 See id.
183 See, e.g., Freedman v. Am. Online, 412 F. Supp. 2d 174, 181 (D. Conn. 2005) ("[F]or
purposes of the Fourth Amendment, a subscriber does not maintain a reasonable expectation
of privacy with respect to his subscriber information."); United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d
500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008)
[El-mail and Internet users have no expectation of privacy in the to/from addresses of
their messages or the IP addresses of the websites they visit because they should know
that this information is provided to and used by Internet service providers for the spe-
cific purpose of directing the routing of information.
Id.; United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 190 (2d Cir. 2004) ("Individuals generally pos-
sess a reasonable expectation of privacy in their home computers ... [but not] in transmis-
sions over the Internet or e-mail that have already arrived at the recipient.").
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formed.'88 The order will only be authorized if there is probable cause to be-
lieve that "an individual is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a
particular offense," and that "particular communications concerning that of-
fense will be obtained through such interception."' 89 There must also be prob-
able cause for the "belief that the facilities from which, or the place where, the
wire, oral, or electronic communications are to be intercepted are being used,
or are about to be used, in connection with the commission of such offense, or
are leased, listed in the name of, or commonly used" by the target of the wire-
tap.' Finally, there must be a showing that "normal investigative procedures"
are ineffective or "reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be
too dangerous."' 9 Even though the probable cause for a wiretap order is the
same as for a warrant for a physical search, the additional requirements of this
statute prohibits law enforcement from using wiretaps in the early stages of an
investigation and make it one of the hardest types of warrants to obtain.'92
Much of this difficulty is attributable to the ECPA's complex definitions.'93
1. Wire Communication
Virtually all communication today traverses a wire at some point.'94 Web-
ster's Dictionary defines "wire" as a thin metal thread or slender rod for con-
ducting electrical current.'95 In non-technical language, this definition would
include every communication that traveled through electrical circuitry.
188 § 2518. The wiretap order must be obtained by a judge with jurisdiction over the
"place where a communication is initially obtained regardless of where the communication




192 See United States v. Sorapuru, 902 F. Supp. 1322, 1327 (D. Colo. 1995) (explaining
that the purpose of the additional requirements "is to ensure that wiretaps are not routinely
employed as the first step in criminal investigation.").
193 See James X. Dempsey, Digital Search & Seizure: Updating Privacy Protections to
Keep Pace with Technology, in 2 Ninth Annual Institute on Privacy and Security Law 543,
547, 560-61 (2008) (arguing that the ECPA is outdated and that the complex language of
the Act must be updated in response to technological changes).
194 See Mark C. Del Bianco, Voices Past: The Present and Future of VoIP Regulation,
14 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 365, 368 (2006).
195 RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 2180-81 (2d ed. 2001).
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However, the ECPA defines wire communications differently:
any aural transfer made in whole or in part through the use of facilities for the trans-
mission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection between
the point of origin and the point of reception (including the use of such connection in
a switching station) furnished or operated by any person engaged in providing or op-
erating such facilities for the transmission of interstate or foreign communications or
communications affecting interstate or foreign commerce. 1
96
The definition contains three components. First, it must be an "aural trans-
fer," meaning there must be an audible voice.'97 Webster's Dictionary defines
"aural" as "of or pertaining to the ear or to the sense of hearing"; 98 however, at
least one court has included an electronic recording device capturing a conver-
sation within the definition of "aural acquisition."'9 9 The transmission of the
aural communication does not have to be from a live human speaker as long as
a human voice is a part of the communication." °
The second section of this definition requires the transmission to be by "aid
of wire, cable, or other like connection" at any point."' Congress intended this
section to include wireless communications from cell phones, satellites, and
fiber optic cables. 2 From cell phone circuitry to the electronic switches used
to link the cell phone towers to the PSTN, all communications contain a metal
wire, satellite, or fiber optic cable at some point between transmission and re-
ception." 3
The final section of the wire communication definition limits the protection
to communications that are furnished or operated by a person who is "engaged
in providing or operating such facilities" for local, domestic, or international
communications or for communications that affect interstate or foreign com-
196 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (2006).
197 § 2510(18). The human voice in this concept must be pure, unadulterated human
voice at some point between transmission and reception. Some transmissions may be mixed
between electronic and aural communications, such as a live video transmission through
closed circuit television. Congress intended to include these mixed communications within
the meaning of aural if the transmission contains the human voice at some point between
transmission and reception. See S. REP. No. 99-541, at 16 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3570.
198 RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 137 (2d ed. 2001).
199 United States v. Turk, 526 F.2d 654, 657-58 (5th Cir. 1976).
200 Id. at 658.
201 18 U.S.C. § 2510(l)(2006).
202 S. REP. No. 99-541, at 12 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3566 ("[A]
wire communication encompasses the whole of a voice telephone transmission even if part
of the transmission is carried by fiber optic cable or by radio-as in the case of cellular tele-
phones and long distance satellite or microwave facilities.").
203 See id. See also Shubert v. Metrophone, Inc., 898 F.2d 401, 404 (3rd Cir. 1990) (not-
ing that "the intention of Congress to include [cellular] communications within the Privacy
Act's protection is apparent from the legislative history ....").
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merce.2 ° The definition remains vague regarding what qualifies as a facility. In
some instances, software installed on two computers may be the "facility" for
communication °.2 5 ECPA replaced the "common carrier" language in this sec-
tion of the definition presumably to expand its reach," 6 but courts are still try-
ing to define the length of that reach. 7
2. Oral Communication
The ECPA also distinguishes "aural communications" from "oral communi-
cations, 2 8 which includes "any oral communication uttered by a person exhib-
iting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception un-
der circumstances justifying such expectation," and explicitly excludes elec-
tronic communications °.2 9 Literally, oral communication is the source of aural
communications. 10 However, the purpose of the separate class of communica-
tions is to protect against electronic eavesdropping.2 Congress intended to
protect conversations from interception through better-than-normal hearing
assistance devices-such as parabolic microphones or remote listening de-
vices-that are not carried through an electronic medium.
1 2
3. Electronic Communications
The ECPA's primary purpose was to extend the protections of wire and oral
communications to a new category of electronic communications.' Congress
defined "electronic communication" broadly to include "any transfer of signs,
204 § 2510(1).
205 See, e.g., SHEPPARD, supra note 115, at I (discussing the use of Skype in making two-
way phone calls over the Internet).
206 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848,
1848.
207 See generally Timothy J. Miano, Formalist Statutory Construction and the Doctrine
of Fair Warning: An Examination of United States v. Councilman, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV.
513 (2007) (providing an in-depth look at some of the shortcomings of federal wiretap laws
as they apply to technology that was not envisioned during the passage of federal wiretap
statutes, and how different circuits have interpreted the statutes).
208 See § 2510(2).
209 § 2510(2).
210 WEBSTER'S ENCYCLOPEDIC UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
1361 (1996) (defining oral as "uttered by mouth; spoken.").
211 See S. REP. No. 99-541, at 13 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3567.
212 See id. ("In essence, an oral communication is one carried by sound waves, not by an
electronic medium."). See also Robert A. Pikowsky, The Need for Revisions to the Law of
Wiretapping and Interception of Email, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 1, 41 (2003).
213 Id. at 1.
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signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted
in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or pho-
tooptical system."24 The definition explicitly excludes oral and wire communi-
cations, which excludes those communications containing voice."5 This defini-
tion, therefore, includes all electronic communications not transmitted by
sound waves, radio waves, or containing the human voice."6
4. Intercept
The ECPA prohibits the interception of wire or electronic communica-
tions."7 The Act defines interception as "aural or other acquisition of the con-
tents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any
electronic, mechanical, or other device."2 '8 The ECPA defines "electronic, me-
chanical, or other device" as "any device or apparatus which can be used to
intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication other than any telephone or
telegraph instrument, equipment or facility, or any component thereof' used by
a subscriber, communication service, or law enforcement officer."9
Traditionally, storage of electronic communications includes temporary sto-
rage while in transmission by a service provider, but does not include, how-
ever, long-term storage of communication after transmission has occurred.2
The ECPA defines storage as "(A) any temporary, intermediate storage of a
wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic transmission
thereof; and (B) any storage of such communication by an electronic commu-
214 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12).
215 § 2510(12) (listing three other exceptions: "(B) any communication made through a
tone-only paging device; (C) any communication from a tracking device...; or (D) elec-
tronic funds transfer information stored by a financial institution in a communications sys-
tem used for the electronic storage and transfer of funds.").
216 S. REP. No. 99-541, at 14 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3568.
As a general rule, a communication is an electronic communication protected by the
federal wiretap law if it is not carried by sound waves and cannot fairly be character-
ized as containing the human voice. Communications consisting solely of data, for ex-
ample, and all communications transmitted only by radio are electronic communica-
tions. This term also includes electronic mail, digitized transmissions, and video tele-
conferences.
Id.
217 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (providing a prohibition against any person who "intention-
ally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor
to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication.") (emphasis added).
218 § 2510(4) (emphasis added).
219 § 2510(5).
220 Computer Crime & Intellectual Prop. Section, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Searching and
Seizing Computers and Obtaining Electronic Evidence in Criminal Investigations 123 (3d
ed. 2009), available at http://www.cybercrime.gov/ssmanualindex.html.
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nication service for purposes of backup protection of such communication. 22'
Since electronic transmissions occur within milliseconds, determining the dif-
ference between the transmission and the temporary or permanent storage of
electronic communications is challenging.22 However, the current trend is to
require that the intercepting acquisition be contemporaneous with the transmis-
sion.223
5. Commerce Clause Limitation
The Commerce Clause limits the scope of the ECPA124 Congress has used
an activity's impact on interstate commerce as the basis to enact many statutes
across a range of issues.225 Traditionally, the Supreme Court has interpreted
"interstate commerce" to include the greatest possible reach of the Commerce
Clause. 226 However, the amount of influence a technology must exert on inter-
state commerce to qualify is not apparent.
Wickard v. Filburn provides the controlling test: if an activity "exerts a sub-
stantial economic effect on interstate commerce," regardless of whether or not
it is considered to be commerce, it is within the purview of the Commerce
Clause and Congress's regulatory a 227 Perez v. United States further ex-
panded the reach of the Commerce Clause, stating "where the class of activi-
ties is regulated and that class is within the reach of federal power, the courts
221 § 2510(17).
222 See, e.g., Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 878 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002);
Bohach v. City of Reno, 932 F.Supp. 1232, 1236 (D. Nev. 1996). See also Alexander Scol-
nik, Protections for Electronic Communications: The Stored Communications Act and the
Fourth Amendment, 78 FORDHAM L. REv. 349, 383-87 (2009).
223 See United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67, 79 (1st Cir. 2005) (noting that e-mail
messages, stipulated as electronic communications within the scope of the Wiretap Act, are
included within the definition of 'intercept' even though they may be stored in temporary
memory while in transition to a final destination); Konop, 302 F.3d at 878 (finding that due
to Congress' amendment of the Wiretap Act, a Web site can only be "intercepted" during
transmission, not when it is in electronic storage).
224 Compare § 2510(1), (12), with U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
225 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1375a(b)(5)(B) (regulating international marriage brokers); 15
U.S.C. § 1644(a) (penalizing the fraudulent use of credit cards); 18 U.S.C. § 38 (penalizing
fraud involving aircraft or space vehicle parts).
226 See Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 577-78 (1963); Citizens Bank v.
Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 56 (2003) (per curiam).
227 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942). Wickard involved a wheat farmer who
exceeded the Secretary of Agriculture's limitations in growing wheat on his farm for his
personal consumption. Id. at 115. Even though the crops were being grown only for the
farmer's personal consumption, the Court held that it had a substantial enough impact on
interstate commerce to bring it within Congress' authority to regulate. Id. at 125.
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have no power 'to exercise, as trivial, individual instances' of the class. 228
However, the Supreme Court drew the line in Lopez v. United States when it
held the Gun-Free School Zones Act unconstitutional because the law-which
prohibited bringing guns onto school campuses-was not sufficiently related to
interstate commerce-and thus outside of Congressional authority under the
Commerce Clause.229
B. Stored Communications Privacy Act
Congress also sought to protect stored communications with the inclusion of
the Stored Communications Act ("SCA"). 2 ' The SCA prohibits the unauthor-
ized access to an electronic communications service or facility "and thereby
obtain[ing], alter[ing], or prevent[ing] authorized access to a wire or electronic
communication while it is in electronic storage . *.".."2' Electronic storage is
defined as "any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic com-
munication incidental to the electronic transmission" and any backup of those
communications by the service provider.32 The Fifth Circuit analyzed the inter-
relationship of the ECPA and the SCA and concluded:
Congress' use of the word "transfer" in the definition of "electronic communication",
and its omission in that definition of the phrase "any electronic storage of such com-
munication (part of the definition of "wire communication") reflects that Congress did
not intend for "intercept" to apply to "electronic communications" when those com-
munications are in "electronic storage. 232
From this complicated interrelation, a working definition of stored commu-
nications is revealed. When a communication is in transmission between the
source and the destination, the ECPA governs.134 However, when a communi-
cation reaches its destination, the SCA governs.235 For example, an e-mail is in
228 Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971) (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392
U.S. 183 (1968)).
229 Lopez v. United States, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995).




233 Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 461-62 (5th Cir. 1994).
234 See United States v. Rodriguez, 968 F.2d 130, 136 (2d Cir. 1992) ("[W]hen the con-
tents of a wire communication are captured or redirected in any way, an interception occurs
at that time.").
235 See Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1072-73 (9th Cir. 2004).
The [Stored Communications] Act reflects Congress's judgment that users have a le-
gitimate interest in the confidentiality of communications in electronic storage at a
communications facility. Just as trespass protects those who rent space from a com-
mercial storage facility to hold sensitive documents ... the Act protects users whose
electronic communications are in electronic storage with an ISP or other electronic
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storage when it is in the drafts folder of the sender's mailbox. The message is
in transmission from the moment that the sender presses "send" until the mo-
ment the e-mail is opened. If the email service stores a copy of the message in
the "Sent Items" folder, then that copy remains in storage while the transmitted
copy is in transmission for 180 days. Before 180 days have passed, the SCA
requires a warrant to be issued to allow government access to the electronic
communication.36 After 180 days have passed, the SCA allows "law enforce-
ment to obtain documents in storage ... with just a subpoena or court order,"
which requires "a showing of less than probable cause."23' Determining wheth-
er an e-mail is in transmission or in storage is critical for a law enforcement
officer seeking to wiretap the communication under an ECPA heightened re-
quirements for a warrant or a court order under the SCA. This determination is
also one of the most arbitrary of federal wiretapping laws.
IV. ANALYSIS
In order to discuss how the federal wiretapping statutes apply to the ECPA
and SCA interception of modem communications technologies, it must be as-
sumed that it is technically possible to intercept and decrypt the contents of the
different communications technologies. Some of the technologies include ad-
vanced encryption algorithms and open source coding to prevent clandestine
attempts to integrate back doors by government and civilian interceptors.'38
These developments have made it increasingly difficult to execute an instanta-
neous wiretap on some communications services.239 However, since intercep-
tion technology grows at the speed of communication innovation, eventually
every communications technology will spawn its own interception technology.
If this assumption is incorrect, then the applicability of the ECPA and SCA to
this technology is merely academic.
communications facility.
Id.
236 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2006).
237 Alexander Scolnik, Protections for Electronic Communications: The Stored Commu-
nications Act and the Fourth Amendment, 78 FORDHAM L. REv. 349, 382-93 (2009); §
2703(b).
238 See, e.g., SHEPPARD, supra note 115, at 3.






Traditional VoIP easily falls within the first two sections of the definition of
wire communications. It is limited and dedicated to transmitting the human
voice from a source to a destination making it an aural transmission."' Even if
a computer recording initiates a communication, such as commonly done by
telemarketers or political campaigns, the human voice is still heard by the re-
cipient, which thus qualifies it as an aural transfer. Furthermore, wires are used
at some point between the transmission and destination during this communi-
cation."'
VoIP must still satisfy the remaining prong outlined by the statute: the wire
aiding the communication must be provided by a facility that ordinarily oper-
ates facilities for communication for interstate or foreign commerce.242 Since
VoIP works in conjunction with an Internet connection, it uses an ISP's wires
and facilities to supply the communication.243 However, not all VoIP providers
also function simultaneously as ISPs.244 For those companies that do provide
ISP and VoIP services, the communication is likely to fall within the definition
of a wire communication.245
Whether non-ISP based VolP providers fall under the federal wiretapping
statutes may depend upon their effect on interstate or foreign commerce. To
assert that such VoIP providers should be included under the wiretapping stat-
utes would require looking at the market and the number of VoIP providers in
the aggregate to show the number of users, as well as the monthly rate, to show
a substantial impact on traditional PSTN providers.246 However, the FCC has
excluded VoIP from state regulation as common carriers247 and has declined to
240 S. REP. No. 99-541, at 12 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3566 (de-
fining "wire communication" as "includ[ing] existing telephone service, and digitized com-
munications to the extent that they contain the human voice at the point of origin.").
241 See S. REP. No. 99-541, at 12 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3566;
see also 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1).
242 See § 2510(1); see also discussion supra Part III.A.i.
243 See GRALLA, supra note 96, at 121-23.
244 Cf H. Russell Frisby, Jr. & David A. Irwin, The First Great Telecom Debate of the
21st Century, 15 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 373, 393 (2007).
245 See S. REP. No. 99-541, at 12, as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3566 ("Wire
communication encompasses the whole of a voice telephone transmission even if part of the
transmission is carried by fiber optic cable or by radio, as in the case of cellular telephones
and long distance satellite or microwave facilities.").
246 Cf Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 128 (1972) (holding that the production of a
product, when viewed in the aggregate, can have a significant impact on market policies).
Under the Wickard principle, VoIP providers should be viewed in the aggregate to deter-
mine their impact on interstate commerce.
247 See In re Vonage Holdings Corporation Petition for Declaratory Ruling Concerning
an Order of the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission, Memorandum Opinion and Order,
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classify VoIP as subject to its Title II regulations. 248 With the rapid changes and
myriad of options in modem communications, it may be impossible to ever
accurately determine the impact of any one technology on interstate commerce.
B. Instant Messaging
Analyzing IM in the context of federal wiretapping laws requires two differ-
ent categories of messaging: standard and enhanced. Standard IM services in-
clude the original text-based communications. 249 Enhanced IM services include
the ability to transmit voice and video along with text-based communica-
tions.25 o
1. Standard Messaging
By excluding voice from the standard messaging category of IM applica-
tions, standard IM services are excluded from the wire communications defini-
tion because they are not an aural communication.25' However, text-based IM is
closely related to one of the listed examples, "writing," in the electronic com-
munication definition, and would likely fit within the first part of the defini-
tion.252
However, courts have held that the use of chat rooms open to the general
public offer users no reasonable expectation of privacy and therefore do not
need any warrant at all to intercept. 53 For example, in United States v. Max-
well, the court held that "[m]essages sent to the public at large in the 'chat
room' or e-mail that is 'forwarded' from correspondent to correspondent lose
any semblance of privacy." '254
However, many instant messaging applications involve private communica-
tions that are easily distinguished from the "public at large" approach because
they are only between two individuals.2 55 For example, in United States v.
19 F.C.C.R. 22,404, 1 (Nov. 9, 2004).
248 See Kevin Ryan, Comment, Communications Regulation-Ripe for Reform, 17
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 771, 791 (2009).
249 James B. Speta, A Common Carrier Approach to Internet Interconnection, 54 FED.
COMM. L.J. 225, 238 (2002).
250 Id. at 237-38.
25 See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1), (18) (2006).
252 § 2510(12).
253 See United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 419 (C.A.A.F. 1996); United States v.
Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. 1177, 1185 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
254 Maxwell, 45 M.J. at 419.
255 See MICHAEL MILLER, ABSOLUTE BEGINNER's GUIDE TO COMPUTER BASIcs 268-72
(2d ed. 2004); see also Maxwell 45 M.J. at 418-19 (distinguishing the expectation of pri-
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Meek, the court analyzed the expectation of privacy between two people in an
online chat, and found it to be similar to a phone call in that "either party ...
has the power to surrender each other's privacy interest to a third party." '256
Commentators have suggested that courts that reject an individual having a
reasonable expectation of privacy in private chat rooms have failed to uphold
the protections that Katz provides. Aya Gruber has noted that:
[T]hese courts deem private chat rooms unprotected simply because there is a poten-
tial that an anonymous conversant may breach confidences. This paves the way for
holding that private chat room or instant message conversations may be monitored by
the police, even when none of the participants has consented to interception. 7
If a court holds that an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in
a private IM conversation, the question then becomes whether IM falls under
the long arm of the Commerce Clause. IM is an invention of and for the Inter-
net.258 IM services cannot fairly be included in the same class of activities as e-
mail because the purpose of IM is for instantaneous communication, 259 while
the purpose of e-mail is to have a letter-based conversation.26 ° Similarly, IMs
cannot fairly be included within a class of phone calls because the technology
has the inherent ability to carry on multiple conversations with groups and in-
dividuals independently and simultaneously.2 1 Furthermore, IM services are
typically offered at no cost to users.262 Defined in its broadest context, IM is
part of a class of communications activities that exist on the Internet. In the
narrowest context, IM is its own separate and distinct technology.
With the vast amount of communications that traverse the Internet, it would
be overly inclusive to categorize all of those communications as part of the
same class of activities for commerce clause purposes. A law enforcement of-
vacy that is lacking in e-mail exchanges due to the ability of the e-mail to be stored, with the
expectation of privacy that can be found in IMs or other 'real time' transmissions, due to the
inherent nature of those communications to be "lost forever").
256 United States v. Meek, 366 F.3d 705, 711 (9th Cir. 2004). See also Paul Ham, War-
rantless Search and Seizure of E-Mail and Methods of Panoptical Prophylaxis, 2008 B.C.
INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 090801, at *9-10 (2008), available at
http://bciptf.org/index.php?option=com content&task=view&id=42&Itemid=30 (comparing
IM communications to private e-mails, and likely having a similar expectation of privacy).
257 Aya Gruber, Garbage Pails and Puppy Dog Tails: Is That What Katz is Made Of?, 41
U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 781, 815 (2008).
258 See RniTTNGHOUSE & RANSOME, supra note 134, § 1.3.1, at 3-4 (2005).
259 See MILLER, supra note 255, at 267 (2d ed. 2004) ("Instant messaging is the ideal
medium for very short, very immediate messages.").
260 Id. at 259 ("An email message is like a regular letter, except that it's composed elec-
tronically and delivered almost immediately via the Internet.").
261 See, e.g., PETER SAINT-ANDRE, ET AL., XMPP: THE DEFINITIVE GUIDE 77-81 (2009);
but see supra text accompanying note 292.
262 See, e.g., Meebo, Meebo Products, http://www.meebo.com/products/ (last visited
March 16, 2010).
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ficer should not have to get an ECPA search warrant to view a Web site that is
available to anyone with a Web browser. Nor should a private chat be subject
to fewer protections than a phone call merely because the words are written.
Similarly, by signaling out each technology as a separate class, the impact of
any individual technology on interstate commerce will result in arbitrary dis-
tinctions based on the popularity of the technology at a given time. Modem
communications must be regulated based upon the privacy of the communica-
tion transmitted and not the popularity of the medium used to transmit that
communication.
If a court holds that an individual does not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in a private IM conversation, then the existence of encryption in these
technologies may play a determinative factor. While some IM services include
encryption, the existence and effectiveness of this encryption is not controlling
when determining whether a wiretap is illegal.263 In 1990, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the Wiretap Act did not ex-
pressly require wireless carriers to provide encryption for cellular transmis-
sions," because Congress changed the "required mens rea" for a violation of
the statute from "willful to intentional. 265
However, much has changed in communications from the 1990s until today.
Encryption has vastly improved and is included seamlessly and cheaply on
many different communications technologies. 2 66 Since this is a relatively un-
tested area of the law, a court may one day hold that an encrypted communica-
tion should be treated differently from an unencrypted communication.
2. Enhanced IM
The vast expansion of IM capabilities has created a new class of technolo-
gies that separates itself from its ancestors. As in the water utility analogy dis-
cussed earlier, when only text is flowing through the pipes, it is a more
straightforward analysis for interception. However, when these pipes have the
ability to include voice, images, documents, pictures, and video, the complex-
263 Cf. Shubert v. Metrophone, Inc., 898 F.2d 401, 405-06 (3rd Cir. 1990) (finding that
"Congress could not have intended that the transmission of a cellular signal to an intended
recipient be considered an intentional divulgence based merely on the circumstance that
technology exists which could make interception more difficult or not possible.").
264 Id. at 405.
265 Id. at 405-06 ("Under the Privacy Act... it is unlawful for the communications pro-
vider to 'intentionally divulge the contents' of a communication . . . we cannot equate
transmission to divulgence even though the transmission may be readily intercepted.").
266 See Mark Mayne, Encryption - Past, Present and Future, SECURE COMPUTING MAGA-
ZINE, Sept. 9, 2009, at 32.
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ity for interception magnifies.
For example, Google Talk, Google's enhanced IM program, separates VolP
and text packets into separate protocols for network efficiency.267 Essentially,
Google Talk creates two different pipes; one pipe falls under the standard IM
analysis, while the other falls under the traditional VolP analysis. Because
Google Talk uses a server-based routing of VolP calls,26 it is therefore closely
analogous to the traditional VoIP configuration, with the exception that
Google's service is free. Configuring a network analyzer to only look for one
type of IM protocol might narrowly fit within the definitions of ECPA but
there are dozens of different types of IM services using many different IM
technologies. The Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement would result
in law enforcement officers, attorneys, and magistrates becoming experts in
telecommunications to determine which content stream to tap for which tech-
nology.
3. Chat on Demand Web Sites
The analysis of enhanced IM also applies to modem chat Web sites, with
one large exception: chats are exposed and thus, the user may not have a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy.269 Without purchasing an encryption and pass-
word protection packet, nothing prevents an unwanted user from stumbling
upon the chat room and reading or listening to the conversation.27 Daniel
Blake, TinyChat.com's co-founder, has stated that chats held on the Web site
are private because "only those who know the link can enter [the] video chat
room."27' While this may provide some level of security in a practical sense,
267 See Summary of XMPP, http://xmpp.org/about/summary.shtml (last visited Oct. 8,
2008); Google, Google Talk for Developers,
http://code.google.com/apis/talk/open communications.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2010)
(providing that Google Talk uses the standard XMPP protocol for authentication, presence,
and messaging).
268 See Google, Google Talk for Developers,
http://code.google.com/apis/talk/open communications.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2010).
269 See United States v. Charbonneau, 979 F.Supp. 1177, 1185 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (hold-
ing that there was not a "reasonable expectation of privacy in the chat rooms"). See also
Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (noting that "through the
use of chat rooms, any person with a phone line can become a town crier with a voice that
resonates farther than it could from any soapbox").
270 See Posting of Robin Wauters, TinyChat Makes Creating Disposable Chat Rooms a
Breeze, to Mashable, http://techcrunch.com/2009/02/18/tinychat-makes-creating-disposable-
chat-rooms-a-breeze/ (Feb. 18, 2009).
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whether this provides a level of privacy under the wiretapping laws remains to
be seen.
C. Decentralized VoIP
Like unencrypted IM communications, decentralized VoIP communications
such as those provided by Skype may reduce the reasonable expectation of
privacy below the threshold of the federal wiretap laws. Because all communi-
cations pass from one computer to the next, the packets are "exposed" to the
public, even if only in a fragmented form."' Decentralized VoIP moves much
like an armored battalion through a city. Instead of the protection existing all
around the communication stream, like the pipe in a water system, in decen-
tralized VoIP, the packets include encryption like the armor on a tank.2 73 The
entire battalion does not take one path through the city, but distributes itself
through the various streets and reassembles at the other end in the same forma-
tion it started. Similarly, Skype encrypted packets take the quickest path
through the fastest super nodes coming together at the other end. 74 During the
time the packets are flowing through the P2P network, they are exposed to the
public with only their encryption armor for protection.
Cracking the high levels of encryption is exceptionally difficult for even the
most powerful supercomputers. 275 Additionally, since only part of any commu-
272 See P2P Telephony Explained, supra note 118 (noting that Skype encrypts the pack-
ets for privacy protection because all Skype calls are publicly routed through "the public
Internet").
273 Data encryption algorithms encode readable information into unreasonable informa-
tion. An algorithm is defined as a "mathematical formula for an operation, such as comput-
ing the check digits on packets of data that travel via packet switched networks." HARRY
NEWTON, NEWTON's TELECOM DICTIONARY 115 (25th ed. 2009). An encryption is defined as
"the transformation of data into a form unreadable by anyone without a secret decryption
key. Its purpose is to ensure privacy by keeping the information hidden from anyone for
whom it is not intended." Id. at 434.
274 See SHEPPARD, supra note 115, at 2-3 (2006).
275 See Cracking Encryption Algorithms, MyCrypto.net,
http://www.mycrypto.net/encryption/encryption crack.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2009).
MyCrytpo.net theorizes it would take a retail CPU that could process one billion keys per
second and include one million of these processors in a supercomputer. With 100 of these
supercomputers working in a network with peak performance and no downtime it would
take twenty thousand years to process all of the possible key combinations. Even factoring a
doubling of technological growth every eighteen months the possibility that a single phone
conversation could be cracked in a person's lifetime is literally impossible without a revolu-
tionary new invention. Id.
However, a large supercomputer may not be necessary to break encryption. In 1997, a
software company accepted a ten thousand dollar challenge to break a specific kind of sixty-
four bit encryption. Using distributed network computing, in which a large group of com-
puters' idle processing power is pooled into a network supercomputer, it took three hundred
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nication will flow through a user's computer and the technology allows a large
number of clients and simultaneous phone calls, an interceptor, even if he were
able to overcome the encryption, would only get a small piece of the content." 6
However, since the network operates on a mostly open source P2P network,
with pieces of the source code freely available to the public, creative software
engineers may be able to trick the network into diverting all communications
from a particular individual through a single, or group of, computers, and the-
reby compile all of the packets of a conversation.
Traditionally, most communications worked along a steady stream of data
flowing from source to destination and a wiretap intercepted the communica-
tions by tapping into and diverting that stream to a third party.2 However, by
decentralizing the communications, anyone in the decentralized VolP network
could have part of that data stream flow directly through their computer mak-
ing them at least a subdestination in route to the final destination. 9 Whether
the compilation and de-encryption of packets sent through a public environ-
ment is the same as an interception of communications is an open question for
the courts.
D. The Next Generation of Phone Calls
The next generation of digital communications will stretch the definition of
aural acquisition. Programs like Ribbit can transform voice data into textual
transcripts of the message."' This one-way communication is partially aural
because a modulated voice synthesis prompts the human voice message.2"' The
transcribed message remains a "stored" communication because it resides in
the user's mailbox,2"2 but once the message is read on a cell phone, it is consid-
thousand computers four years to find the key. See Andy Patrizio, Codebusters Crack En-
cryption Key, WIRED, Oct. 7, 2002,
http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2002/10/55584.With the explosion of peer-
to-peer networks and the rapid growth of processing power in home PCs in the past decade,
the computing power necessary to break this encryption may reside within the same net-
works that are carrying phone calls.
276 Cf SHEPPARD, supra note 115, at 1-2.
277 Cf id. at 170-73.
278 See People v. Chavez, 44 Cal. App. 4th 1144, 1149-50 (1996) (distinguishing elec-
tronic interception or wiretapping usually involves the connection to the wires, while elec-
tronic eavesdropping, or bugging, involves all other forms of electronic surveillance).
279 See SHEPPARD, supra note 115, at 2-3.
280 Ribbit, Ribbit for Salesforce - How it Works,
http://www.ribbit.com/crm/salesforce/how-it-works.php (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
281 See S. REP. No. 99-541, at 16 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3570
(providing that aural means the unadulterated human voice).
282 See 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (prohibiting unauthorized access to communications stored
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ered to be an electronic transmission. With technology like this, the line be-
tween stored and transmitted communications is exceptionally unclear.
If the program accepts voice prompts to navigate a Web site or database,
then the communication qualifies as a wire communication because it contains
voice transmitted over a wire." 3 However, the difference is that this communi-
cation is between an individual and a computer,2" which is not the type of
communication that Congress sought to protect with the ECPA.85 If the same
interaction happened with a keyboard and mouse it would not qualify as a wire
communication because it would lack the human voice to make it an aural
communication. Because of the particularity requirement in the Fourth
Amendment, it is vital for law enforcement officers and magistrates to know
which provision of the wiretapping statute is being used when issuing a wire-
tapping order. This surety is virtually impossible when applying the current
statutory scheme to modem communications mediums.
V. THE STRUCTURAL FRAMEWORK FOR NEW WIRETAPPING
LEGISLATION
Modem communication follows Moore's law: technology grows exponen-
tially.2"6 Congress follows the turtle law: slow and steady wins the race. None-
theless, Congress must overhaul the categorical definitions of ECPA and the
artificial distinction between stored and in-transmission communications and
replace it with a more holistic regulation that can handle innovation.
Instead of letting the technology govern the structure of wiretapping laws,
Congress should let the use of technology govern the laws. In Katz, the Court
reviewed a FBI's electronic eavesdropping of a bookie using a public tele-
phone.287 The agents attached a listening device to the outside of the glass-
enclosed phone booth and listened in to the conversation between the bookie
in "electronic storage system[s]").
283 See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1).
284 See Press Release, Ribbit, Ribbit for Salesforce: Voice Automation for Sales-
force.com on the Appexchange (Oct. 2008), in CRM MAGAZINE, Oct. 2008, at 7.
285 See S. REP. No. 99-541, at 13 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3567.
286 See William Aspray, Preface, in CHASING MOORE'S LAW: CHASING INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY IN THE UNITED STATES (William Aspray ed., 2004). Moore's law is a way to
"quantitatively describe the pace of innovation in the semiconductor industry." It states that
"the number of electronic switches that can be placed on a computer chip doubles every 18
months." This practical concept has become a "metaphor for the rapid, incessant course of
technological innovation that is occurring in the computing and communications field." Id.
at ix.
287 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967).
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and the gamblers."8 The Court declared this listening to be an unlawful search
because "[o]ne who occupies [a phone booth and makes] a call is surely enti-
tled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broad-
cast to the world." '289 Despite Katz's physical exposure to the public-that any-
one could look through the glass and into the phone booth to see him-the
Court held that he was entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
conversation.29 This distinction exists because:
the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes
to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the
public, may be constitutionally protected.29'
Thus a two-part test governs when a person may have a constitutionally pro-
tected conversation. The first part of the Katz test is that the person must "have
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy. 92 This prong requires
that a person, in claiming that the Fourth Amendment protects their communi-
cation, must show that they expected their communication to be private. 93 In
the context of communications, an individual has a subjective expectation of
privacy when they have a telephone conversation with another party and is not
aware that other parties may be listening in by speakerphone. 94
The second part of the Katz test is that the expectation must be something
that society is willing to recognize as reasonable.295 In applying this to the con-
text of communications, courts tend to find that someone who sends an e-mail
to another has a subjective expectation of privacy.296 As one federal court
found, "With regard to email communications... '[a]lthough e-mail commu-
nication, like any other form of communication, carries the risk of unauthor-
ized disclosure, the prevailing view is that ... confidential information [may
288 Id.
289 Id. at 352-53.
290 Id.
291 Id. at 351 (internal citation omitted).
292 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
293 Id. at 351. For example, in California v. Ciraolo, the Supreme Court held that a per-
son who grew marijuana in his backyard behind a six-foot outer fence and ten-foot inner
fence that completely enclosed his backyard had exhibited a clear "manifest[ation] of his
own subjective intent and desire to maintain privacy ... California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S.
207, 209-211(1986).
294 See, e.g., State v. Christensen, 102 P.3d 789, 792 (Wash. 2004) (holding that the de-
fendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a telephone conversation with his girl-
friend when her mother would listen in via a speakerphone).
295 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). In Ciraolo, even though Ciraolo sought
to shield his backyard from outside viewers, the Court held that that subjective belief did not
"preclude an officer's observations from a public vantage point where he has a right to be
and which renders the activities clearly visible." Ciraolo, at 213.
296 See Brown-Criscuolo v. Wolfe, 601 F.Supp 2d 441, 449 (D.Conn. 2009).
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be communicated] through unencrypted e-mail with a reasonable expectation
of privacy."'297
Not every communication through the Internet has a "constitutionally pro-
tected reasonable expectation of privacy,''2 but some communications qualify
as having both subjective and objective expectations of privacy. The design
and use of a communications medium plays a large factor in determining the
appropriate level of privacy. After a thorough analysis of all of the modem
forms of communications, three categories emerge in determining the reason-
ableness of a user's expectation of privacy in their communication: public,
quasi-public, and private communications.
A. Public Communications
Public communications are those in which there can be no constitutionally
protected expectation of privacy. These communications, for Fourth Amend-
ment purposes, are a broadcast to the world.299 Examples of strictly public elec-
tronic communications include hosting a Web site or posting a comment on a
blog.3" However, even these activities may create a subjective or objective
expectation of privacy. For example, a person may have a subjective and ob-
jective expectation of privacy to their bank transaction information posted on
their bank's Web site if it is hosted on a secure Web site and is protected by a
usemame and password."' If a communication is truly exposed to the public,
then Congress should not attempt to blind law enforcement from viewing the
content and no warrant should be necessary to view that material.
The majority of SNW communications are public communications that are
297 Id. (citing In re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd., 322 B.R. 247, 256 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2005)).
298 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 360.
299 See, e.g., Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F.Supp. 584, 589 (M.D.La. 1986), aff'd 808 F.2d
54 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that a conversation broadcast over a radio transmission is not
protected by the Fourth Amendment).
300 See United States v. Gines-Perez, 214 F. Supp.2d 205, 225-26 (D.P.R. 2002) (stating
that people who post material on the Web sites have no reasonable expectation of privacy).
301 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 1 SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 2.6(f), at 721 (4th ed. 2004).
The technology for limiting telephone access to computer files is not foolproof, and
thus "hackers" sometimes manage to penetrate through the safeguards and reach sup-
posedly private information. However, that risk alone is hardly sufficient to deprive
these records of a justified expectation of privacy under Katz. 'Reliance on protections
such an (sic) individual computer accounts, password protection, and perhaps encryp-
tion of data should be no less reasonable than reliance upon locks, bolts, and burglar
alarms, even though each form of protection is penetrable.'
Id. § 2.6(f), at 721.
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broadcasted to the world or a large group of individuals invited to view the
content. Any information that is visible on these SNWs to any other registered
member of the SNW should be considered a public communication." 2 This
may include status updates, pictures, comments, group affiliations, and other
personal details that individuals chose to reveal.
B. Quasi-Public Communications
Quasi-public communications are those communications which are other-
wise public communications, but are used in such a way that there is a reason-
able expectation of privacy attached to their use. Congress should afford these
some level of protection under the Fourth Amendment, depending on the steps
taken to secure the communications from general public disclosure. If there is a
legitimate expectation of privacy, then a standard search warrant should be
required for law enforcement to view this material.
Some SNW allow users to highly restrict dissemination of their information
to selective groups of other users.3"3 When these privacy filters are configured,
a more fact-intensive inquiry must be conducted to determine the subjective
intent of the individual to keep that information private. For example, if a
SNW user restricted all of the content on his or her Web site to only those
friends with whom he or she was personally closest to, then the information
carries some expectation of privacy. However, if this same individual freely
opens their content to people he or she does not know well, then there should
be little expectation of privacy to this content.
The distinction is akin to social interactions outside of the electronic realm.
Personal information that an individual shares with anyone they meet is not
considered to be private information.3"4 However, information that is only
shared with a person's most trusted confidants carries at least some expectation
that that information will not be shared publicly.3 '
C. Private Communications
Private communications are those that carry a presumption of privacy be-
302 Cf Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1967) (holding that a person has no
legitimate expectation of privacy in the information they freely provide to others).
303 See JESSE FElLER, HOW To Do EVERYTHING: FACEBOOK APPLICATIONS 33-34 (2008)
(showing how a user of Facebook can limit access of their content to "[aIll my networks and
all my friends", "[s]ome of my networks and all my friends..., or to "[o]nly my friends").
304 See Smith, 442 U.S. at 743-44.
305 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 ("[W]hat [someone] seeks to preserve as private, even in an
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.").
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cause the nature of the communication would lead reasonable individuals to
believe that they are having a private communication. Congress should afford
these types of communications the highest levels of protection under the
Fourth Amendment and require a strong showing of need, similar to the EC-
PA's requirement, when law enforcement seeks to wiretap this type of com-
munication.
A phone call between two individuals-whether it exists over the PSTN,
VoIP, instant messaging, Skype, or even the next generation Web integrated
voice communication-is not intentionally exposed to the public. When people
use these forms of technologies to communicate, they expect their conversation
to remain private from the outside world. When this type of communication is
combined with leading-edge encryption technology, the subjective expectation
of privacy in that communication should increase.3"6 Likewise, an IM between
two individuals is the equivalent of a phone call in written form and should
carry the same protections as a phone call.
VI. CONCLUSION
The current balance struck between ensuring the privacy of communications
and legitimate law enforcement investigation techniques fails to provide an
adequate framework for modem communications. As the lines between cate-
gorical wire, oral, and electronic, and stored communications blur, the balance
will become even more detrimental to both sides of the equation. A broad re-
design of wiretapping law is required to rebalance the competing interests of
privacy and law enforcement.
306 See Paul Ohm, Good Enough Privacy, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 56-57 (2008)
("[M]any employees seemed to see the use of encryption as a signal or flag of the secrecy of
a message.").
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